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每年六月,政策制定者,监管者,银行家,投资者,和金融高管齐聚上海，参加陆家嘴论坛,中国'首屈一指的金融政策会议。如果达沃斯是全球精英讨论世界经济未来的地方, 陆家嘴日益成为北京表明其打算如何塑造未来以服务其自身利益的地方。作为美国人,，尽管我们当前的关注点存在各种分歧,，但我相信今年的的 论坛值得我们关注。
Every June, policymakers, regulators, bankers, investors, and financial executives gather in Shanghai for the Lujiazui Forum, China的 premier financial policy conference. If Davos is where global elites discuss the future of the world economy, Lujiazui is increasingly where Beijing signals how it intends to shape that future to serve its own interests. As Americans, despite all the ways that our current focus is divided, I believe that this year的 forum deserves our attention.
在今年的陆家嘴论坛,上，中国官员公布了一系列措施，旨在扩大离岸人民币(RMB)金融,深化上海'作为国际金融中心的地位,为外国央行和主权投资者,建立新的流动性设施,扩大跨境人民币交易,并进一步向国际参与开放中国的金融部门的部分领域。
At this year的 Lujiazui Forum, Chinese officials unveiled a series of measures designed to expand offshore renminbi (RMB) finance, deepen Shanghai的 role as an international financial center, create new liquidity facilities for foreign central banks and sovereign investors, expand cross-border RMB trading, and further open portions of China的 financial sector to international participation.
确实，我们之前已经听过很多这样的说法，, 对于怀疑者和许多观察者来说, 如果对其诚意或可实现性存有怀疑，这是可以理解的。中国是否最终准备好并认真地挑战美元? 答案是，中国毫无疑问地认真地挑战美元主导地位,，但这也是一个错误的问题。
It is true that we have heard much of this before and, for skeptics and many observers, it is understandable if there are doubts about its sincerity or achievability. Is China finally ready and serious about posing a challenge to the U.S. dollar? The answer is that China is unquestionably serious about challenging aspects of dollar dominance, but it is also the wrong question.
我认为世界27世纪的焦点不应该放在中国是否会实现人民币取代美元的真正目标上。世界应该更加关注这样一个事实：北京继续,一点一点、一步一步,有条不紊地建设必要的金融基础设施，以减少其对以美元为中心的全球体系的依赖，并为其他国家创造美国金融实力的替代品。换句话说,中国是认真的,，但它可能无法实现其目标,，至少不能很快。 , 正在做什么，但是, 将自己定位为美元主导地位的有力竞争者和破坏者。
I would argue that the world的 focus should not be on whether China will achieve its very real goal of having the renminbi replace the dollar. The world should focus more on the fact that Beijing continues, bit by bit and step by step, to methodically build the financial infrastructure necessary to reduce its dependence on a dollar-centric global system and create alternatives to American financial power for other countries. In other words, China is serious, but it may not be able to achieve its goals, at least not quickly. What it is doing, however, is positioning itself as a serious contender and disruptor of dollar dominance.
这主要不是一个金钱故事。这是一个地缘政治问题。
This is not primarily a monetary story. It is a geopolitical one.
近八十年来,美国因美元在全球金融体系中的核心地位而享有非凡的优势。美元的主导地位为华盛顿提供了以前的大国难以想象的治国工具。美国可以实施制裁,限制美元清算,制定国际合规标准,影响资本流动,并利用其在世界'金融架构中的地位来推进国家安全目标。 China understands this reality as well as anyone and, like many countries, has bristled at this enormous concentration of power for decades.
For nearly eighty years, the United States has enjoyed extraordinary advantages from the dollar的 central role in the global financial system. Dollar dominance has provided Washington with tools of statecraft that previous great powers could scarcely imagine. The United States can impose sanctions, restrict access to dollar clearing, shape international compliance standards, influence capital flows, and leverage its position within the world的 financial architecture to advance national security objectives. China understands this reality as well as anyone and, like many countries, has bristled at this enormous concentration of power for decades.
Today, it is in a better position than ever before to do something about it.
人民币国际化二十年规划迈上新台阶
Two-decade renminbi internationalization plan reaches new stage
中国领导层花了近二十年的时间试图推动人民币国际化。自 2008 年全球金融危机之后开始, 北京推出人民币贸易结算计划, 建立离岸清算中心, 扩大货币互换安排, 开发替代支付基础设施, 并逐步开放部分资本市场。
The Chinese leadership has spent nearly two decades attempting to internationalize the renminbi. Beginning in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis, Beijing launched RMB trade settlement programs, established offshore clearing centers, expanded currency swap arrangements, developed alternative payment infrastructure, and gradually opened portions of its capital markets.
它并不是能够取代或削弱美元主导地位的灵丹妙药。但中国的故事很少涉及即时性和迅速性。这是关于有条不紊的决心和渐进的进步。陆家嘴宣布的最新措施只是这个更长故事的最新篇章。今年'的公告尤其值得注意，因为恰逢中国'“十五五”规划实施的第一年。 China is not wasting any time in getting this plank of the plan off to a robust start, and that matters.
It has not been a silver bullet capable of displacing or weakening dollar dominance. But the story of China is rarely about immediacy and swiftness. It is about methodical determination and incremental advancement. The latest measures announced at Lujiazui are simply the newest chapter in that longer story. What makes this year的 announcements particularly noteworthy is that they coincide with the first year of implementation of China的 15th Five-Year Plan. China is not wasting any time in getting this plank of the plan off to a robust start, and that matters.
西方观察家有时将中国的规划文件视为愿望清单,宣传文件,或白板上产生的雄心勃勃的想法的集合。北京对他们的看法不同。五年计划不是营销手册。它们是资源分配文件，决定监管优先事项, 指导国有企业, 影响贷款决策, 直接省级政府, 并在整个中国体系中发出战略优先事项的信号。
Western observers sometimes view Chinese planning documents as aspirational wish lists, propaganda documents, or collections of ambitious ideas generated on a whiteboard. Beijing views them differently. Five-Year Plans are not marketing brochures. They are resource-allocation documents that shape regulatory priorities, guide state-owned enterprises, influence lending decisions, direct provincial governments, and signal strategic priorities throughout the Chinese system.
It is therefore important to remind policymakers, investors, and businesses that the new 15th Five-Year Plan elevates finance to the level of a national strategic objective. Chinese leaders have repeatedly described the goal of building China into a "financial powerhouse," strengthening Shanghai and Hong Kong as international financial centers, expanding offshore RMB markets, improving cross-border payment infrastructure, and steadily advancing RMB internationalization.
重要的是,这些目标不再仅仅是中国经济学家的讨论话题。它们现已嵌入中国'的主要国家规划文件,中，这意味着监管机构,国有银行,省级政府,和金融机构都可以调整资源和政策决策来支持这些目标。这些努力最终能否成功是一个重要问题。然而, 毫无疑问的是北京是否打算无情且积极地追击它们。
Importantly, these objectives are no longer merely discussion topics among Chinese economists. They are now embedded within China的 primary national planning document, which means regulators, state-owned banks, provincial governments, and financial institutions can all be expected to align resources and policy decisions in support of these goals. Whether these efforts ultimately succeed is an important question. However, what is not in question is whether Beijing intends to pursue them relentlessly and aggressively.
华尔街若不理睬这一威胁，后果自负
Wall Street dismisses the threat at its own peril
世界以前看过这部电影。许多西方分析人士最初对“中国制造2025”的雄心不屑一顾。批评者指出技术缺陷,市场扭曲,资本配置不当,国家干预效率低,腐败,以及实施方面的问题。所有这些担忧在当时都是合理的。然而，北京继续缓慢但有意识地,实施产业政策,增加补贴,指导银行部署国家融资,建立积极的采购优惠,重点大学培养工程和技术人才,并提供优惠的监管支持以实现其目标。
The world has seen this movie before. Many Western analysts initially dismissed the ambitions associated with Made in China 2025. Critics pointed to technological deficiencies, market distortions, misallocation of capital, inefficient state intervention, corruption, and questions about implementation. All these concerns were reasonable at the time. Yet Beijing continued to move forward slowly but deliberately, implementing industrial policy, increasing subsidies, directing banks to deploy state financing, establishing aggressive procurement preferences, focusing universities on training engineering and technology talent, and providing preferential regulatory support in pursuit of its goals.
结果并不完美。但这足以帮助中国在众多战略领域建立全球重要地位。事实上,许多人会记得，正是《中国制造2025》的日益成功引发了特朗普政府 2018年的第一场贸易战。教训并不是北京总是成功或成功得那么快。教训是，一旦具有重要战略意义的目标被纳入国家规划文件和长期竞争战略，北京很少会放弃这些目标。
The result was not perfection. But it was sufficient enough to help China establish globally significant positions across numerous strategic sectors. Indeed, many will recall that it was the growing success of Made in China 2025 that helped trigger the first Trump administration的 2018 trade war. The lesson is not that Beijing always succeeds or does so quickly. The lesson is that Beijing rarely abandons strategically important objectives once they become embedded in national planning documents and long-term competition strategy.
这一现实值得华盛顿,、硅谷,、特别是华尔街更多关注。许多投资者将陆家嘴的公告视为一个积极的进展，这是可以理解的。扩大离岸人民币交易,新的流动性便利,加深债券市场,以及更多地接触中国金融产品为全球资本创造了机会。但投资者应小心，不要将这些举措与中国打算完全开放资本账户并允许资本流动完全根据市场基本面进行调整相混淆。
This reality deserves more attention in Washington, in Silicon Valley, and in particular on Wall Street. Many investors will understandably view the Lujiazui announcements as a positive development. Expanded offshore RMB trading, new liquidity facilities, deeper bond markets, and greater access to Chinese financial products create opportunities for global capital. Yet investors should be careful not to confuse these moves with a China that intends to fully open its capital account and allow capital flows to move solely according to market fundamentals.
中国推行这些改革并不是为了取悦华尔街或证明自己已成为一个金融自由经济体。相反,这些措施旨在减少中国'对美国金融杠杆的敞口，并为在国际舞台上追求其利益创造更大的战略行动自由。 As a result, the geopolitical risks surrounding China-related financial exposure are likely to increase, not decrease.
China is not pursuing these reforms simply to please Wall Street or to prove that it has become a financially liberal economy. Rather, these measures are intended to reduce China的 exposure to U.S. financial leverage and create greater strategic freedom of action in pursuing its interests on the international stage. As a result, the geopolitical risks surrounding China-related financial exposure are likely to increase, not decrease.
Currently, the Congressional China hawks are silent — or silenced by Trump. In private, they will tell you that they don't like his China policy, but they won't openly say it.但国会不太可能无限期地袖手旁观。 During the Biden administration, Congress demonstrated growing interest in outbound investment screening, pension fund exposure, index provider decisions, and the role of American capital in supporting Chinese firms linked to strategic industries. Outbound investment screening remains unfinished business in Washington, and future efforts to expand screening authorities could place greater scrutiny on U.S. financial participation in Chinese markets.
Currently, the Congressional China hawks are silent — or silenced by Trump. In private, they will tell you that they don't like his China policy, but they won't openly say it. But Congress is unlikely to remain on the sidelines indefinitely. During the Biden administration, Congress demonstrated growing interest in outbound investment screening, pension fund exposure, index provider decisions, and the role of American capital in supporting Chinese firms linked to strategic industries. Outbound investment screening remains unfinished business in Washington, and future efforts to expand screening authorities could place greater scrutiny on U.S. financial participation in Chinese markets.
Should Democrats regain control of the House, or should Republican China hawks regain political momentum, lawmakers could revive aggressive legislation focused on strategic competition with China.对华尔街'的中国风险敞口的监督几乎肯定会成为对话的一部分。
Should Democrats regain control of the House, or should Republican China hawks regain political momentum, lawmakers could revive aggressive legislation focused on strategic competition with China. Oversight of Wall Street的 China exposure would almost certainly be part of that conversation.
参议员伊丽莎白·沃伦 (Elizabeth Warren) 一再对与中国的金融往来表示担忧。 At the same time, Republican China hawks continue to advocate, often quietly, for tougher restrictions on capital flows into sectors viewed as supporting Chinese military modernization or strategic competition.结果是两党不同寻常的融合。美国国家安全机构的进步怀疑论者和国家安全鹰派往往在几乎所有事情上都存在分歧。对与中国某些形式的金融接触越来越多的,持怀疑态度，这是他们利益重叠的少数领域之一。
Senator Elizabeth Warren has repeatedly raised concerns regarding financial engagement with China. At the same time, Republican China hawks continue to advocate, often quietly, for tougher restrictions on capital flows into sectors viewed as supporting Chinese military modernization or strategic competition. The result is an unusual bipartisan convergence. Progressive skeptics of the U.S. national security establishment and national security hawks often disagree on almost everything. Increasingly, skepticism regarding certain forms of financial engagement with China is one of the few areas where their interests overlap.
Outside the United States, however, many countries are likely to welcome the news coming out of Shanghai. Recent geopolitical events may accelerate China的 efforts and increase their appeal across the Global South, the Middle East, and even among some allies and partners such as Canada and several ASEAN states. The Iran conflict, concerns regarding sanctions enforcement, disputes surrounding U.S. trade policy, and broader questions about the future of globalization and dollar weaponization have encouraged many governments to seek greater strategic flexibility.特朗普政府反复无常且经常咄咄逼人的行动引发了人们对过度依赖任何单一金融体系的担忧。
Outside the United States, however, many countries are likely to welcome the news coming out of Shanghai. Recent geopolitical events may accelerate China的 efforts and increase their appeal across the Global South, the Middle East, and even among some allies and partners such as Canada and several ASEAN states. The Iran conflict, concerns regarding sanctions enforcement, disputes surrounding U.S. trade policy, and broader questions about the future of globalization and dollar weaponization have encouraged many governments to seek greater strategic flexibility. The erratic and often aggressive actions of the Trump administration have caused concern about excessive dependence on any single financial system.
这并不意味着各国希望完全放弃美元。这也不意味着他们想变得依赖中国。许多人仍然对北京及其意图深表怀疑。 What it does mean is that many now view a hedge, an alternative, as more attractive than at any point in the past eighty years. China understands this, and that is precisely why Beijing sees a wider window of opportunity.中国不需要人民币取代美元来取得战略胜利。 In fact, Beijing的 objective may be considerably more modest and therefore more achievable: creating enough alternatives that countries no longer feel compelled to rely exclusively on the dollar-based system. It only needs enough countries, institutions, and investors to maintain a viable alternative.
That does not mean countries wish to abandon the dollar altogether. Nor does it mean they want to become dependent on China. Many remain deeply skeptical of Beijing and its intentions. What it does mean is that many now view a hedge, an alternative, as more attractive than at any point in the past eighty years. China understands this, and that is precisely why Beijing sees a wider window of opportunity. China does not need the renminbi to replace the dollar in order to achieve a strategic victory. In fact, Beijing的 objective may be considerably more modest and therefore more achievable: creating enough alternatives that countries no longer feel compelled to rely exclusively on the dollar-based system. It only needs enough countries, institutions, and investors to maintain a viable alternative.
A world in which a meaningful share of trade, energy transactions, sovereign reserves, development finance, and cross-border payments can operate outside traditional dollar channels is strategically different from the world that existed just a decade ago.这种可能性才是上海陆家嘴论坛所宣布的真正意义。因此，华盛顿面临的问题不是人民币是否会成为下一个美元。 The question is whether the U.S. is paying sufficient attention to a competitor that has formally declared its intention to become a financial powerhouse and appears prepared to devote the next five years to making that ambition a reality.
A world in which a meaningful share of trade, energy transactions, sovereign reserves, development finance, and cross-border payments can operate outside traditional dollar channels is strategically different from the world that existed just a decade ago. That possibility is the real significance of the announcements made in Shanghai at the Lujiazui Forum. The question facing Washington is therefore not whether the renminbi will become the next dollar. The question is whether the U.S. is paying sufficient attention to a competitor that has formally declared its intention to become a financial powerhouse and appears prepared to devote the next five years to making that ambition a reality.
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